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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the usual custodial interrogation scenario, police officers are required to give 
suspects the familiar warnings that the U.S. Supreme Court first enunciated in the 
1966 case of Miranda v. Arizona.2  This requirement narrows, however, when the 
suspect is a prisoner.3  Since prisoners are by definition in government custody, a 
majority of state and federal courts have required more than government custody to 
trigger Miranda’s safeguards in prison.  A majority of those courts applies a totality-
of-the-circumstances analysis, drawing on four factors to determine whether the 
prisoner was subjected to an additional restraint beyond normal prison conditions.  
Part I of this Note will review a recent Colorado case involving the interrogation 
of a juvenile prisoner and the application of the additional-restraint factors within a 
totality-of-the-circumstances analysis.  Part II will analyze how the decision in the 
Colorado case and the additional-restraint factors comport with the meaning of 
“custody” as set forth in U.S. courts’ jurisprudence on custodial interrogations.  Part 
III will propose that juvenile prisoners should be presumed in custody for Miranda 
purposes absent exceptional circumstances.  It then will present the justification for 
this presumption, including a discussion of the solicitude normally provided to 
juveniles in the criminal justice system.  Part III also explores the problems with the 
additional-restraint factors and the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis.  This essay 
concludes that juvenile prisoners should be found to be in custody for Miranda 
purposes, unless certain exceptional circumstances are present. 
II.  THE PROBLEM: PEOPLE EX REL. J.D.  
In its 1999 opinion in People ex rel. J.D., the Colorado Supreme Court 
considered how to determine when a questioned juvenile prisoner is in custody such 
that officers must give Miranda warnings before interrogating the juvenile.4  In J.D., 
the juvenile defendant moved to supress statements she made to state officers while 
in jail.5  The Morgan County District Court granted her motion, and the District 
Attorney took an interlocutory appeal.6  In reversing, the Colorado Supreme Court 
held that whether a juvenile prisoner is in custody for Miranda purposes is 
determined by an analysis of the totality of the circumstances.7 
                                                                
2Those warnings are: 
Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain 
silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that 
he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.  
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). 
3For the purposes of this note, a prisoner is a juvenile or adult who has been convicted of a 
crime and is incarcerated in a detention facility, jail or prison.  In general, juveniles are held in 
a juvenile detention facility rather than in a prison with adults.   
4989 P.2d 762 (Colo. 1999). 
5Id. at 765. 
6Id. 
7Id. at 771. 
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A.  The Facts: J.D.’s Conversation with Police  
J.D., a 16-year-old juvenile, had been detained in Colorado by Fort Morgan 
police for violating her Nevada probation.8  At that initial detention, Detective Keith 
Kuretich asked J.D. if she would answer questions regarding an armed robbery in 
Colorado.9  She refused.  In response, Kuretich gave her his name and telephone 
number in case she changed her mind and wanted to speak with him later.  The 
police then transported J.D. to a state juvenile detention center in Stateline, Nevada.10   
On the next day, J.D. called Kuretich from the Nevada detention facility and left 
a message for him to return her call.  The next morning, Kuretich returned J.D.’s 
telephone call and spoke directly to her.  During the course of this conversation, J.D. 
told Kuretich that she wanted to talk with him about the armed robbery.  In response, 
Kuretich told J.D. that he would call again later and asked her to make arrangements 
for someone she trusted to be present during their conversation.11  
After his conversation with J.D., Kuretich contacted J.D.’s mother.  Kuretich 
orally provided Miranda warnings to the mother and told her about J.D.’s telephone 
call to him.12  J.D.’s mother told Kuretich that she knew J.D. wanted to talk to him 
and that the she approved of such a conversation.13  
Later that same day, Kuretich again called J.D.  Another detective, Nick Gardner, 
joined Kuretich and listened through a speakerphone.14  Steve Hagen, J.D.’s Nevada 
probation officer, and June Foster, a detention officer at the facility, were in the room 
with J.D. during the conference call.15 
The conversation lasted approximately forty minutes.  At the outset, Kuretich 
offered to do what he could to dismiss other charges against J.D. for “resisting arrest, 
obstructing and criminal mischief.”16  Regarding the armed robbery, the trial court 
found Kuretich “assured” J.D. that under Colorado law she could be charged as an 
adult, but that if she cooperated, “there would be minimal or no charges brought”; 
that is, she would be charged as a juvenile.17  The trial court found that there “was 
active encouragement directed by words toward [her] to cooperate and to give a full 
statement” and that the probation officer in the room was “actively encouraging her 
to make a statement as he felt it would be in her interest to do that.”18  J.D. then 
agreed to proceed, asking Kuretich, “Well do you want to know what happened, or 
                                                                
8Id. at 765-66. 
9J.D., 989 P.2d at 765. 
10Id. at 767. 
11Id. at 765. 
12Id. at 766. 
13Id. 
14J.D., 989 P.2d at 766. 
15Id. at 771. 
16Id. at 766. J.D. had been detained by the Fort Morgan police for an unrelated incident at 
a local motel.  
17Id.  
18Id. 
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not?”19  J.D. then discussed details of the armed robbery, including the identities of 
participants and the weapon used.20  At the end of the speakerphone conversation, 
Kuretich told J.D. that her mother had approved the interview earlier in the day.21  
Kuretich did not give Miranda warnings to J.D. at any time during the telephone 
conversation.  At no time did J.D. ask to end the call.22 
B.  Colorado Law 
1.  Totality-of-the-Circumstances Analysis 
By the time J.D. was decided, the Colorado Supreme Court had held in People v. 
Denison23 that to determine whether a prisoner is in custody for Miranda purposes, 
courts must conduct a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, using four additional-
restraint factors.24  The four factors are: the language used to summon the prisoner; 
the physical surroundings of the interrogation; the extent to which the prisoner is 
confronted with evidence of his or her guilt; and, the additional pressure exerted to 
detain the prisoner.25 
2.  Statutory Safeguards  
A Colorado statute forbids the admission of incriminating statements made by 
juveniles during a custodial interrogation unless a parent, guardian, or legal or 
physical custodian of the juvenile was present and both were advised of the 
juvenile’s Miranda rights.26  Thus, the statute provides juveniles with a level of 
protection beyond Miranda.  The statutory protection is not triggered, however, 
                                                                
19J.D., 989 P.2d at 766. 
20Id. 
21Id. 
22Id.  
23918 P.2d 1114 (Colo. 1996). 
24Id. at 1116. 
25Id. 
26The statute provides:  
No statements or admissions of a juvenile made as a result of a custodial interrogation 
… shall be admissible in evidence against such juvenile unless a parent, guardian, or 
legal or physical custodian of the juvenile was present at such interrogation and the 
juvenile and his or her parent, guardian, or legal or physical custodian were advised of 
the juvenile’s right to remain silent and that any statements made may be used against 
him or her in a court of law, of his or her right to the presence of an attorney during 
such interrogation, and of his or her right to have counsel appointed if he or she so 
requests at the time of the interrogation. 
6 COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-511(1) (1999). 
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unless there is a custodial interrogation.27  The public policy behind the statute is that 
juveniles may not fully understand their Fifth Amendment rights.28  
C.  The Judgment of the Colorado Supreme Court 
In J.D., the Colorado Supreme Court held that under the totality of the 
circumstances, a telephone conference call between two detectives and a jailed 
juvenile, in the presence of a detention officer and a probation officer, was not a 
custodial interrogation.29  Thus, though the juvenile was not given Miranda 
warnings, the juvenile’s incriminating statements during the questioning were 
admissible against her in delinquency proceedings.  
1.  Majority Opinion 
The majority opinion in J.D., which four justices joined, extended Denison to 
juveniles.30  Thus, it held that to determine whether a juvenile prisoner is in custody 
for Miranda purposes, courts must consider the totality of the circumstances, 
beginning with the four additional-restraint factors identified in Denison: (1) the 
language used to summon the prisoner; (2) the physical surroundings of the 
interrogation; (3) the extent to which the prisoner is confronted with evidence of his 
or her guilt; and (4) the additional pressure exerted to detain the prisoner.31  
The majority further listed ten other factors that could be considered in the 
totality-of-the-circumstances analysis: time, place and purpose of the encounter; 
persons present during the interrogation; words spoken by officer to defendant; 
officer’s tone of voice and general demeanor; length and mood of interrogation; any 
limitation of movement or other form of restraint placed on defendant during 
interrogation; officer’s response to any questions asked by defendant; whether 
directions were given to defendant during interrogation; defendant’s verbal or 
nonverbal response; and, presence of parents or whether parents had knowledge of 
the interrogation.32 
Despite its listing of these additional factors, the majority opinion focused on the 
four additional-restraint factors set out earlier in Denison.33  Regarding the language 
used to summon J.D., the court stated that J.D. had not been summoned; rather, she 
voluntarily had initiated the communication.34  The court then concluded that J.D. 
had experienced no adverse change in her physical surroundings.35  It stated that J.D. 
                                                                
27Id. 
28See People v. Raibon, 843 P.2d 46, 50 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992) (stating that the statute’s 
“legislative purpose is to provide to the minor an opportunity to consult with a parent or 
guardian before deciding whether to assert or to waive his or her Fifth Amendment rights”). 
29J.D., 989 P.2d at 767. 
30Id. 
31Id. at 768. 
32Id. 
33Id. 
34J.D., 989 P.2d at 771. 
35Id. 
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had not been subjected to face-to-face questioning by the detectives.36  Further, the 
probation officer and the detention officer, whom she trusted, had been present.37  
Reviewing the third factor, the majority stated that J.D. had been confronted with 
evidence of her guilt, including pictures that appeared to show her involvement in 
the robbery.38  Reviewing the fourth factor, the court concluded that there was no 
evidence of any additional pressure exerted to detain J.D.39  The court then held that 
J.D. had not been “in custody.”40  Since J.D. had not been in custody, Miranda 
warnings were not required.  Further, the extra statutory protection provided to 
juveniles during custodial interrogations did not apply, and the presence of a parent, 
guardian, or custodian was not obligatory.41  J.D.’s statements thus were admissible 
against her.  
2.  Dissenting Opinion 
The dissenting opinion, joined by three justices, also considered the totality of the 
circumstances in light of the additional-restraint factors.42  The dissent accepted the 
trial court’s findings and concluded that the trial court correctly had applied the 
additional-restraint factors.43  
Regarding the first factor, the language used to summon the individual, the trial 
court had found nothing significant in the way the officers summoned J.D.44  
Regarding the second factor, the physical surroundings of the investigation, the trial 
court had found that the room was separate from the general population at the 
detention center and two officers were present during the entire interrogation.45  
Applying the third factor, the extent to which J.D. was confronted with evidence of 
her guilt, the trial court had found that Kuretich explained to J.D. that evidence 
incriminating her was available.46  Addressing the fourth factor, the additional 
                                                                
36Id. 
37The majority presumed that J.D. had arranged for these two adults to be present based on 
Kuretich’s suggestion. 
38J.D., 989 P.2d at 768.  The Colorado Supreme Court majority opinion did not specify 
how or when photographs were shown or mentioned to J.D. The dissenting opinion stated that 
Detective Kuretich had shown J.D. photographs from the robbery when Kuretich met J.D. in 
person while she was detained in Fort Morgan.  Id. at 773.  The prosecutor informed the 
author that Kuretich had reminded J.D. of the existence of the photos during the subsequent 
telephone conference call that is at issue in the case.  Telephone Interview with Christian J. 
Schulte, Deputy District Attorney, Fort Morgan, Colo. (Mar. 30, 2000) [hereinafter Schulte 
interview]. 
39J.D., 989 P.2d at 772. 
40Id. 
41Id. at 773. 
42Id. at 775 (Martinez, J., dissenting). 
43Id. at 775-76. 
44J.D., 989 P.2d at 776. 
45Id. 
46Id. 
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pressure exerted to detain J.D., the trial court had found the use of coaxing and 
implied threats that unless J.D. cooperated, full charges would be brought against 
her.47  The dissent stated that there was “ample evidence to support the trial court’s 
finding” that additional pressure was exerted to detain J.D.48  In conclusion, the 
dissent believed that under the deferential, clearly erroneous standard of review, the 
trial court’s findings should not be disturbed.49 
III.  LEGAL PRINCIPLES 
A.  Miranda: General Custodial Interrogation Principles 
To evaluate J.D., it is necessary to review the development of the custodial 
interrogation doctrine that originated with the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
Miranda.50  The U.S. Supreme Court has imposed bright-line procedural safeguards 
to protect individuals during custodial interrogations.  The familiar Miranda 
warnings must be given to an individual who is subject to a custodial interrogation.51  
The Court defined custody as when “a person has been taken into custody or 
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” 52 In a 
subsequent opinion, the Court held that the interrogation aspect is satisfied by “any 
words or actions on the part of the police … that the police should know are 
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.”53  The Court 
has carved three exceptions to the bright-line rule requiring Miranda warnings prior 
to all custodial interrogations: questioning conducted under exigent circumstances, 
questioning of unrestrained persons at the crime scene, or questioning by an 
undercover agent.54 
B.  Determining “Custody” in Prison Interrogations 
1.  U.S. Supreme Court Precedents 
Miranda had involved stationhouse questioning.  There, the Court did not need to 
address the peculiar situation of interrogation inside a prison.  A prisoner is by 
definition in government custody, but is it “custody” for purposes of Miranda as 
well?  The movement of a prisoner is always restrained, and the prisoner clearly is 
not free to leave.55  By this reasoning, all interrogations of prisoners by state actors 
                                                                
47Id.  
48Id. 
49J.D., 989 P.2d 777. 
50384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
51See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. 
52Id. 
53Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980). 
54See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477 (Miranda warnings not required prior to on-the-scene 
questioning of unrestrained persons); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 (1984) 
(Miranda warnings not required when public safety at risk); Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 
300 (1990) (Miranda warnings not required when undercover officer questioned prisoner). 
55As Laurie Magid, Associate Professor at Widener Law School, has written:  
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would require Miranda warnings.  The Court has confronted the issue of custody of 
prisoners on several occasions.56 
In its 1968 opinion in Mathis v. United States, the Court extended Miranda to the 
prison setting.57  In Mathis, a state prisoner had been interviewed by an Internal 
Revenue Service agent about possible tax violations.58  The prisoner was aware that 
the agent was a government official investigating the possibility of noncompliance 
with the tax laws.59  Under the significant-deprivation-of-freedom-of-movement test, 
a prisoner may fall within Miranda’s definition of custody.60  Specifically, the Court 
held that Miranda warnings were required when an individual is in prison for an 
offense unrelated to the interrogation.61  The agent did not give Miranda warnings 
before questioning the prisoner; consequently, the Court held that the prisoner’s 
incriminating statements were not admissible at his subsequent trial on tax fraud 
charges.62  In Mathis, the Court did not question whether the prisoner was in custody, 
and expressly refused to narrow the scope of Miranda’s “clear and unequivocal 
language.”63  It thus might appear that custody in prison was simply custody for 
Miranda purposes.  However, in dissent, Justice White stated that Miranda  
rested not on the mere fact of physical restriction but on a conclusion that 
coercion – pressure to answer questions – usually flows from a certain 
type of custody, police station interrogation of someone charged with or 
suspected of a crime.  Although petitioner was confined, he was at the 
time of interrogation in familiar surroundings.64 
In its opinion in Illinois v. Perkins,65 the Court had an opportunity to address the 
question of whether prisoners are per se in custody for purposes of Miranda.66  In 
                                                          
The traditional test for determining if a person was in custody when questioned 
focuses on whether there was a restraint on the defendant's freedom of movement of 
the degree associated with formal arrest and that would have made a reasonable person 
feel he was not free to leave. 
Laurie Magid, Questioning the Question-Proof Inmate: Defining Miranda Custody for 
Incarcerated Suspects, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 883, 939 (1997). 
56See Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 4 (1968); Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292; 
Bradley v. Ohio, 497 U.S. 1011 (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of cert.). 
57Mathis, 391 U.S. at 4-5. 
58Id. at 4. 
59Id. 
60Id. at 5. 
61Id. at 4-5. 
62Mathis, 391 U.S. at 4-5. 
63Id.  The Court wrote:  We find nothing in the Miranda opinion which calls for a 
curtailment of the warnings to be given persons under interrogation by officers based on the 
reason why the person is in custody.  In speaking of ‘custody’ the language of the Miranda 
opinion is clear and unequivocal….  
64Id. at 7 (White, J., dissenting).  
65496 U.S. at 292. 
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Perkins, the prisoner had engaged in an incriminating conversation with an 
undercover agent whom the prisoner believed to be a friendly fellow prisoner.67  The 
Court concluded that the prisoner was not in custody for purposes of Miranda 
because the “essential ingredients of a ‘police-dominated atmosphere’ and 
compulsion are not present when an incarcerated person speaks freely to someone 
whom he believes to be a fellow inmate.”68  The Court held that “Miranda warnings 
are not required when the [incarcerated] suspect is unaware that he is speaking to a 
law enforcement officer and gives a voluntary statement.”69  
Thus the Court held in Perkins that an undercover agent in prison need not give 
Miranda warnings before questioning a prisoner.70  It is also important to note what 
the Court did not say.  The Court did not clarify the more general question regarding 
what standard to apply to prison interrogations when the prisoner knows that the 
interrogators are government officers.71  Further, the Court declined to address 
whether the bare fact of being in jail constituted custody.72  The Court did not 
mention the additional-restraint factors, even though the circuit courts of appeals had 
been using them for several years.73  Perhaps this is because the parties in Perkins 
did not discuss these factors.74  
Justice Marshall, in dissent, argued that incarceration constitutes custody as 
defined in Miranda.75  Further, Justice Marshall argued that the psychological 
pressures unique to custody work to the state’s advantage such that the bare facts of 
custody and interrogation are enough to trigger the Miranda warnings requirement.76  
Justice Marshall’s argument, if accepted, would find custody per se for interrogations 
of prisoners in prison.  
Subsequently, in the same year Perkins was decided, Justice Marshall, in dissent 
from a denial of a petition for certiorari in Bradley v. Ohio,77 identified the question 
                                                          
66Id. at 299-300. 
67Id. at 294. 
68Id. at 296.  
69Id. at 294. 
70Perkins, 496 U.S. at 300. 
71Id.  
72Id. at 299.  The Court stated:  The bare fact of custody may not in every instance require 
a warning even when the suspect is aware that he is speaking to an official, but we do not have 
occasion to explore that issue here. 
73See, e.g., Cervantes v. Walker, 589 F.2d 424 (9th Cir. 1978).  
74See 1988 U.S. Briefs 1972, Brief for Petitioner, Brief for Respondent, and Reply Brief 
for Petitioner, Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990) (No. 88-1972). 
75See Perkins, 496 U.S. at 304 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
76See id. at 307-08 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  “Custody works to the State’s advantage in 
obtaining incriminating information. …[T]he pressures unique to custody allow the police to 
use deceptive interrogation tactics to compel a suspect to make an incriminating statement.”  
77497 U.S. 1011 (1990). 
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2001
26 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:17 
left open by the Court in Perkins,78 acknowledged the differing efforts of the lower 
courts to resolve it, and asserted that the Court needed to clarify what constitutes 
custody in a prison setting.  
In Bradley, a group of prisoners was strip-searched immediately after a murder in 
the prison’s sheet metal shop.  After finding blood on a prisoner’s clothing, the 
prison officials directly asked the prisoner several questions, including, “[D]id you 
do it?”79  Justice Marshall stated that custody should have been found under 
Miranda, reasoning that the prisoner “was clearly in custody because he had been 
formally arrested.”80  Further, Justice Marshall concluded that an additional restraint, 
were it required, had been imposed on the prisoner because he was “detained in the 
sheet metal shop, targeted as a suspect in a serious crime, and forcibly strip 
searched.”81  Justice Marshall argued that a coercive environment had been present 
on the ground that prison is “undoubtedly a ‘police dominated atmosphere.’”82  
Further, quoting from the majority opinion in Perkins, Justice Marshall stated: 
“Given the virtually complete control that prison officials exercise over prisoners’ 
lives, petitioner surely felt compelled to answer questions ‘by the fear of reprisal for 
remaining silent or in the hope of more lenient treatment should he confess.’”83  
C.  Lower Court Opinions  
During the time period between Mathis and Bradley, several appellate courts had 
dealt with this issue.  The federal circuits and the state courts have refused to 
interpret Miranda and Mathis as imposing a per se rule that all prisoners are in 
custody.  Some courts have argued that to do so would accord to prisoners a higher 
level of constitutional protection than free individuals enjoy.84  Absent a per se rule 
of custody, different courts have reached opposite conclusions about prison custody 
                                                                
78Id. at 1013 (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of cert.) (quoting Perkins, 496 U.S. at 
299) (“This Court recently left open the question whether ‘[t]he bare fact of custody [would] 
in every instance require a warning even when the suspect is aware that he is speaking to an 
official.’”).  
79Bradley, 497 U.S. at 1013. 
80Id. at 1013. 
81Id. at 1014. 
82Id. at 1015. 
83Id. at 1015 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Perkins, 496 U.S. at 297). 
84See Cervantes, 589 F.2d at 428 (stating that adoption of per se custody rule for prisoner 
would provide greater protection to prisoner than free individual).  
However, a prisoner who is only deemed in custody when a sufficient additional 
restraint is imposed arguably has fewer rights than a free individual.  For example, if 
all prisoners are shackled when transported, the restraint would not be additional to the 
normal prison environment.  If the shackled prisoner is then detained during 
transportation and interrogated, the prisoner is not in custody for Miranda purposes, 
notwithstanding the high likelihood that a reasonable person would find that prisoner 
to be in custody. 
10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol49/iss1/4
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when faced with similar facts.85  Thus, a disputed question arose among the state and 
federal courts:  When is a prisoner in custody for Miranda purposes? 
The Ninth Circuit addressed the application of Miranda to the interrogation of a 
prisoner by a known government official in 1978, in its opinion in Cervantes v. 
Walker.86  In Cervantes, the prisoner had been incarcerated in a county jail.  After 
directing the prisoner to the prison library for questioning regarding involvement in a 
recent fight, a deputy had searched the belongings that the prisoner had placed on a 
table outside the library’s door.87  On finding a matchbox containing a suspicious 
substance, the deputy had entered the library and asked the prisoner to identify the 
substance.88  The Ninth Circuit concluded that the deputy’s questioning was a 
spontaneous reaction at the crime scene.89  Thus, the questioning did not result in a 
pressure to detain sufficient to have caused a reasonable person to believe his 
freedom had been further diminished.90  
The court in Cervantes distinguished Mathis on the ground that there the prisoner 
had been questioned by a government agent who was not a member of the prison 
staff, regarding a matter not under investigation within the prison itself.91  The Ninth 
Circuit held that incarceration does not ipso facto render an interrogation custodial; 
rather, an individual is only in custody for Miranda purposes if, under the totality of 
the circumstances, a “reasonable person would believe there had been a restriction of 
his freedom over and above that in his normal prisoner setting.”92  The Ninth Circuit 
held that four factors should be considered: the language used to summon the 
prisoner, the physical surroundings of the interrogation, the extent to which the 
prisoner is confronted with evidence of his guilt, and the additional pressure exerted 
to detain the prisoner.93  
Cervantes is the seminal case regarding determination of custody in prison and 
represents the majority view among the U.S. courts of appeals.94  Acceptance is not 
                                                                
85Compare United States v. Conley, 779 F.2d 970, 973-74 (4th Cir. 1985) (finding no 
custody when prisoner wore handcuffs and full restraints because inmates were commonly 
transported in that manner) with State v. Conley, 574 N.W.2d 569, 572 (N.D. 1998) (finding 
custody when prisoner wore handcuffs during interview per prison policy). 
86589 F.2d 424, 427 (9th Cir. 1978). 
87See id. at 426.  
88See id. at 427. 
89See id. at 429. 
90See id.  See also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477 (stating that general on-the-scene questioning 
of unrestrained persons is not affected by Miranda holding).  
91See Cervantes, 589 F.2d at 428. 
92Id. 
93See id.  
94See Magid, supra note 55, at 936-937 (noting that eight of the twelve circuits and at least 
seventeen states have declined to find for Miranda purposes custody for prisoners). Opinions 
embracing the Cervantes standard include, e.g., United States v. Scalf, 725 F.2d 1272, 1275 
(10th Cir. 1984); Flittie v. Solem, 775 F.2d 933, 944 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc); United States 
v. Conley, 779 F.2d 970, 973 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Willoughby, 860 F.2d 15, 23-24 
(2nd Cir. 1988); United States v. Menzer, 29 F.3d 1223, 1231-32 (7th Cir. 1994); Garcia v. 
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universal, however; several courts, judges, and commentators have argued that 
custody should be evaluated differently.95  
IV.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Juveniles in Jail Should Be Presumed in “Custody” for Purposes of Miranda 
The Supreme Court of Colorado erroneously analyzed the totality of the 
circumstances in its application of the additional-restraint factors to J.D.  The 
holding in J.D. is problematic not only as applied in that case, but because it presents 
a risk of repetition in other cases.   
The meaning of custody for prisoners should be interpreted broadly.96  A fortiori, 
juvenile prisoners questioned by state actors should be presumed in custody for 
purposes of Miranda unless exigent circumstances are present.  Juveniles are less apt 
than adults to be aware of their rights and to understand the criminal justice setting.   
                                                          
Singletary, 13 F.3d 1487, 1492 (11th Cir. 1994); State v. Tibiatowski, 590 N.W.2d 305 (Minn. 
1999); Leviston v. Black, 843 F.2d 302 (8th Cir. 1988).  
95The dissent in Cervantes, and several other courts and judges maintain that a prisoner is 
in custody for Miranda purposes.  See, e.g., Cervantes, 589 F.2d at 429 (Anderson, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that the Cervantes test is unrealistic and unworkable); Young v. State, 
234 So. 2d 341, 345 (Fla. 1970) (stating, prisoner was “without question ‘in custody,’ as 
defined in Mathis….”); Wade v. Mancusi, 358 F. Supp. 103, 104 (W.D.N.Y. 1973); United 
States v. Cadmus, 614 F. Supp. 367, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that prisoner is per se in 
custody for Miranda purposes); United States v. Morales, 834 F.2d 35, 40 (2nd Cir. 1987) 
(Oakes, J., concurring) (arguing that Miranda supports a rule that prisoners are per se in 
custody); People v. Alls, 629 N.E.2d 1018, 1027 (N.Y. 1993) (Kaye, C.J., dissenting in part) 
(proposing that prisoners are in custody absent exigent circumstances); State v. Holt, No. 725 
N.E.2d 1555 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (holding that Miranda applies to any person in custody). 
Other courts have applied the Cervantes factors broadly and found custody.  See, e.g., 
State v. Deases, 518 N.W.2d 784, 789 (Iowa 1994) (finding additional restraint when prisoner 
was interrogated in different cell while wearing handcuffs); State v. Conley, 574 N.W.2d 569, 
572 (N.D. 1998) (finding custody when prisoner wore handcuffs per prison policy during an 
interview in a prison office); United States v. Chamberlain, 163 F.3d 499, 501 (8th Cir. 1999), 
reh’g denied (finding custody when prisoner was questioned in a prison office but was not 
handcuffed).  
Commentators arguing against the Cervantes standard include: Magid, supra note 55, at 
933 n.170; David C. Berg, Note, Criminal Procedure: Putting the Fifth Amendment Behind 
Bars, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 455 (1989) (arguing for per se rule); Steve Finizio, Note, Prison 
Cells, Leg Restraints, and ‘Custodial Interrogation’: Miranda’s Role in Crimes That Occur in 
Prison, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 719, 730 (1992); Cecilia Jaisle, Note, Miranda Means What It 
Says: Protection Against Self-Incrimination for the Juvenile Custodial Interrogee, 26 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 267, 288 (2000). 
96According to Professor Magid: 
Upon being summoned and questioned, an inmate will generally feel sufficiently 
pressured such that it is reasonable for courts to conclude that he is in custody at that 
point and to require the usual Miranda warnings for all custodial interrogations.  
Requiring the warnings before interrogation in prison strikes a proper balance between 
individual rights and law enforcement needs.  There should be opportunities to obtain 
statements from inmates, but only once the inmates know and understand all of their 
rights…. 
Magid, supra note 55, at 933 n.170 (emphasis added).  
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1.  How This Presumption Should Work 
A presumption that juvenile prisoners are in custody would require that 
interrogators provide juvenile prisoners with Miranda warnings; however, this 
presumption would not require Miranda warnings prior to every conversation 
between a state actor and a juvenile prisoner.  The Miranda protections would be 
triggered only when there is both custody and interrogation.  Accordingly, 
conversations or other interactions that do not rise to the level of interrogation would 
not trigger Miranda.  An exception should be allowed when exigent circumstances 
are present.97  
2.  Justification for This Presumption 
a.  The Special Nature of Juvenile Suspects Warrants Greater Protection 
In cases involving juveniles, the public policy argument for a broader reading of 
Miranda and Mathis is even stronger than that for adults.  The U.S. Supreme Court 
has “emphasized that admissions and confessions of juveniles require special 
caution.”98  Juveniles are generally less knowledgeable than adults regarding their 
rights within the criminal justice system.  The Court has stated that a child is an 
“easy victim of the law” such that special care must be used.99  
A recurrent question has been the ability of juveniles to comprehend; that is, to 
understand the nature of a questioning session, a custodial interrogation, or the 
meaning of the Miranda warnings.100  Many states, by statute or judicial authority, 
specifically provide added protection to juveniles in the interrogation context.101  
                                                                
97See supra note 53 (discussing exceptions created by the U.S. Supreme Court). Chief 
Judge Kaye, Court of Appeals of New York, has proposed:  
When there is no prison-related need to avoid Miranda… an interrogation should be 
preceded by advice that the suspect may decline to answer–the setting is already 
coercive enough to trigger Miranda, without additional restraints or coercion.  By the 
same token, in certain exigent circumstances it may be necessary to place added 
restraints on a prisoner and receive immediate answers.  In these cases, fair application 
of the added restraint test should result in suppression. 
Alls, 629 N.E.2d at 1027 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting in part). 
98In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 45 (1967).  See also Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 732 
(1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (“This Court repeatedly has recognized that 
‘the greatest care’ must be taken to assure that an alleged confession of a juvenile was 
voluntary.”).  
99Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948) (stating that when “a mere child–an easy victim 
of the law–is before us, special care in scrutinizing the record must be used”).  
100See id. at 601.  See also Editorial, Protecting Kids, Promoting Justice, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 
30, 2000, at 20 (discussing “the appalling practice of allowing kids to waive their Miranda 
rights with no adult to guide them” and “overwhelming evidence that juveniles under the age 
of fifteen (and in some cases older) do not have the cognitive ability to knowingly waive their 
constitutional rights”).  
101See, e.g., Matter of Aaron D., 290 N.Y.S. 2d 935 (1968); Lewis v. State, 288 N.E. 2d 
138 (Ind. 1972); In re K.W.B., 500 S.W.2d 275, 281-82 (Mo. App. 1973); Commonwealth v. 
Smith, 372 A.2d 797 (Pa. 1977); People ex rel. Dino, 359 So. 2d 586, 591-93 (La. 1978); 
J.E.S. v. State, 366 So. 2d 538 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); State v. Presha, No. A79-98, 2000 
LEXIS 354, at *10 (N.J. 2000).  See also ALA. R. JUV. P. 11(B) (stating that, juvenile in 
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Some of these jurisdictions require the presence of a parent or an attorney at all 
custodial interrogations of juveniles.102  For example, the Kansas Supreme Court 
recently concluded that the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis is not sufficient to 
ensure that a child under the age of fourteen has made an intelligent and knowing 
waiver of his rights in a custodial interrogation.103  In that case, the court stated, “The 
heavy burden of proving a knowing waiver by a juvenile is on the State.”104  The 
court then held that a per se exclusionary rule applies to statements made by a 
juvenile under fourteen years old unless the juvenile consulted with his or her parent, 
guardian, or attorney regarding waiver of his or her Miranda rights.   
The interrogation of a juvenile prisoner is susceptible to coercion and thus raises 
due process concerns.  It may not be a technique for obtaining confessions that is 
“compatible with a system that presumes innocence and assures that a conviction 
will not be secured by inquisitorial means as on whether the defendant’s will was in 
fact overborne.”105  The minimal cost of requiring the Miranda warnings for 
interrogations of incarcerated juveniles is justified by the importance of the 
individual rights involved.106  Courts should require the provision of Miranda 
warnings to all incarcerated juvenile interrogees.  Unless exigent circumstances are 
present107, or the juvenile makes a knowing and intelligent waiver of his or her rights, 
any statements made by the juvenile should be excluded.108 
b.  Existing Safeguards Are Inadequate 
i.  Judicial Application of Totality-of-the-Circumstances Analysis:  Where J.D. Went 
Wrong 
Depending on a court’s application, the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis can 
be more protective or less protective of the constitutional rights of a juvenile 
                                                          
custody must be informed of the right and the means to communicate with counsel, parent, or 
guardian, if not present). 
102See Robert McGuire, Note, A Proposal to Strengthen Juvenile Miranda Rights: 
Requiring Parental Presence in Custodial Negotiations, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1355, 1378-80 
(2000) (discussing states that deem juvenile confessions involuntary when made in absence of 
parent or guardian).  
103See In re In the Matter of B.M.B., 955 P.2d 1302, 1312 (Kan. 1998). 
104Id. at 1309.  
105See Perkins, 496 U.S. at 301 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
106As an editorialist for the CHICAGO TRIBUNE wrote:  
The logistics of providing a juvenile with counsel [during interrogation] can hardly be 
overwhelmingly burdensome given the number of states that have adopted similar 
[laws]….[W]e are bound to choose constitutional rights over logistical inconvenience.  
Editorial, supra note 100, at 20.  
107This Note does not address directly whether the Perkins undercover agent exception 
should apply to juveniles. 
108This Note does not address directly the inquiry into the voluntariness of a waiver of 
constitutional rights.  See, e.g., Elizabeth Maykut, Who is Advising Our Children: Custodial 
Interrogation of Juveniles in Florida, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1345, 1371 (1994); McGuire, 
supra note 102, at 1359.  
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prisoner.  The J.D. majority listed fourteen factors that could be considered in the 
totality-of-the-circumstances analysis.109  An application of the fourteen factors to the 
situation in J.D. should indicate strongly that the interrogation of J.D. was custodial.  
To illustrate this point, the following section discusses each of the factors and the 
relevant facts from J.D.  
The language used to summon the prisoner.  The majority opinion stated that J.D. 
had not been summoned; rather, she had initiated the conversation. Certainly, J.D. 
and Kuretich had previous contacts, including phone calls initiated by each of them, 
respectively.  When the scheduled time for the telephone conference call arrived, it is 
likely, though not described in the record, that a detention officer escorted J.D. to the 
office where the call was to occur.  The trial court found that “the language used to 
summon the person [was] not indicative of anything one way or the other here.”110  
When an officer summons a prisoner there is an implicit command to submit to the 
officer’s will.  Even if J.D. expected the meeting to occur, that does not mitigate the 
fact that J.D. was summoned by an officer and escorted to a separate room in the jail. 
The physical surroundings of the interrogation.  Oddly, the majority stated that 
during the interrogation J.D. was not segregated from the general population at the 
facility.111  In contrast, the dissent stated that the trial court found that the discussion 
had occurred in a room separate from the general population.112  Separation from the 
general population has been a distinguishing fact in other cases.113  Even when in a 
room with an unlocked door, a prisoner by definition is not able to move without the 
consent of the authorities.114 
The extent to which the prisoner is confronted with evidence of his or her guilt.  
Both the majority and dissenting opinions concluded that J.D. had been confronted 
with incriminating evidence.  Kuretich told J.D. that she was a suspect in a robbery 
and that other charges were pending against her.  Kuretich asserted that J.D. was a 
lookout and she saw the entire crime.115  Kuretich explained to J.D. that he could 
work out a deal with the district attorney regarding J.D.’s involvement in the robbery 
if J.D. provided helpful information.116  Kuretich also claimed that others might 
implicate J.D.  
                                                                
109See supra section I(C)(1) listing the factors. 
110Transcript of Proceedings, at 8, People ex. rel. J.D. (Colo. Dist. Ct. Mar. 19, 1999) 
[hereinafter Transcript]. 
111See J.D., 989 P.2d at 772. 
112See id. at 776.  See also Transcript, supra note 110, at 6.  The prosecutor informed the 
author that J.D. and the Nevada officers participated in the conference call from an office in 
the detention center.  Schulte interview, supra note 38. 
113See, e.g., Conley, 574 N.W.2d at 571-72, 575 (finding custody when interview occurred 
in prison office); Chamberlain, 163 F.3d at 501 (finding custody when interview occurred in 
prison office). 
114J.D. “was not at full liberty to leave.”  Transcript, supra note 110, at 6.  See 
Chamberlain, 163 F.3d at 504 (stating that prisoner would have violated prison rules by 
leaving the interview room without permission).  
115See J.D., 989 P.2d at 776. 
116See id. at 773-74. 
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The additional pressure exerted to detain the prisoner.  The majority opinion 
found that no additional pressure was exerted to detain J.D.; however, the facts 
necessitate the opposite conclusion.  The interrogators exerted additional pressure on 
J.D. to provide incriminating information by threatening her with full criminal 
charges, including the possibility of being charged as an adult.  The trial court had 
found “both coaxing and some implied threats” that if J.D. did not cooperate, 
information would be sought from others, and the state would proceed with full 
charges against her.117  For example, the dissent wrote, Kuretich told J.D. that once 
he brought other suspects in, 
… I may offer them the same kind of deal.  Let me know about the 
robbery and who was involved and in turn I’m gonna give you this kind of 
deal.  Which means that they may be not going to jail but they may finger 
you, and then, you’re gonna have to go to jail.118 
As the excerpt above indicates, Kuretich pressured J.D. to provide more information 
or face a harsher penalty.  
Time, place and purpose of the encounter.  The questioning occurred during the 
day, in a room separate from the general detention population.119  As the trial court 
found, the questioning’s purpose was to gain information regarding a robbery, 
including the potentially criminal acts of J.D.120 
Persons present in the room during the interrogation.  J.D., a probation officer, 
and a detention officer, were the only people in the room; two Fort Morgan 
detectives were connected via speakerphone.  The majority stated that J.D. had 
arranged for the two officers to be present based on Kuretich’s direction to get 
someone she trusted.121  The dissent, however, argued that the record did not support 
the majority opinion’s conclusion that J.D. trusted or arranged the presence of the 
officers.122  The dissent concluded that the record supported the trial court’s opposite 
conclusion.  The dissent stated that “J.D.’s language betrayed her uneasiness with the 
whole interrogation.  In fact, Kuretich had to point out that she needed to start 
trusting someone.”123 
                                                                
117See Transcript, supra note 110, at 5.  According to the majority opinion, J.D. did not 
indicate any unwillingness to talk about her role in the robbery.  See J.D., 989 P.2d at 772.  In 
contrast, the dissent noted that the “promises and threats [by Hagen and Kuretich] increased 
when she appeared reluctant to give a statement.”  Id. at 776 (Martinez, J., dissenting). 
118See J.D., 989 P.2d at 774 (Martinez, J., dissenting). 
119See Transcript, supra note 110, at 3 and 6. 
120See id. at 3. 
121See J.D., 989 P.2d at 771. 
122The dissent maintained: 
Nowhere does the record even suggest that J.D. trusted Hagen or Foster, only that 
Kuretich instructed her to get someone she trusted.  Nevertheless, the majority 
assumes that J.D. was able to carry out these instructions, make the arrangements for a 
private room with a speakerphone, and find people she trusted while in detention.  
Id. at 776-77 (Martinez, J., dissenting). 
123Id. at 777 (Martinez, J., dissenting). 
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The fact that J.D. involved the use of a telephone conference call rather than 
solely a face-to-face interaction does not minimize the coercive possibilities.  
Further, it is possible that the combination of the physical presence of two officers 
and the telephone presence of two detectives, is more inherently coercive than a 
traditional face-to-face interrogation.  The holding in J.D. creates a telephone 
loophole that allows for coercive conduct.  Hypothetically, under this loophole, 
detectives could dispense with Miranda simply by arranging a conference call, even 
if the defendant and the detectives were only separated by a wall. 
Words spoken by officer to defendant, officer’s response to any questions asked 
by defendant, and officer’s tone of voice and general demeanor.  These three factors 
overlap and illustrate that Kuretich, J.D., and the probation officer interacted as if it 
were a typical stationhouse interrogation.  Kuretich used conventional police 
bargaining methods.  He told J.D. that a deal might be worked out based on the 
information she would provide.124  He also told her that some people had talked 
already and others would be interrogated.125  
A typical negotiation technique is to use one officer as a friendly and trustworthy 
figure.  The friendly officer helps convince the suspect of the reasonableness of the 
other officer’s point.  The suspect is more likely to agree with the friendly officer 
than to challenge both officers.  This technique, whether intended or not, occurred in 
J.D. As this excerpt demonstrates, the probation officer supported Kuretich’s 
statements:  
Kuretich: ‘[P]art of the deal that we’ve worked out is if any charges were 
filed, we wouldn’t charge her as an adult, but probably as a juvenile, 
which would make a big difference on how much time you serve in jail, if 
any at all.’  
Hagen: ‘What it sounds like to me here, is with your cooperation they 
won’t go after you with full charges.  If you don’t cooperate with them 
they might go after you with all the charges.’126 
In the exchange above, Hagen seconded Kuretich’s statement, and so played a role in 
eliciting statements from J.D.  The trial court thus properly found that Hagen, the 
probation officer, actively encouraged J.D.127  
Defendant’s verbal or nonverbal response.  Often J.D.’s responses were, as 
reprinted in the dissent, “inaudible.”128  This suggests either that she was too far from 
the telephone or that she was reluctant or uneasy about speaking to the officers.  
Under the former interpretation, J.D. would have been too far from the telephone to 
exercise control over it.  Under the latter interpretation, contrary to the majority’s 
                                                                
124See Transcript, supra note 110, at 5 (“There was both coaxing and some implied threats 
that if she was not willing to cooperate than they would seek information from others and then 
would proceed with full [sic] panoply of charges against her.”). 
125See J.D., 989 P.2d at 774 (quoting unpublished transcript of conference call attended by 
J.D., Detectives Kuretich and Gardner, and Officers Hagen and Foster). 
126Id. 
127See Transcript, supra note 110, at 5. 
128J.D., 989 P.2d at 774. 
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conclusion, J.D. would not have been in control of the interrogation.129  The trial 
court explicitly found that J.D. did not have control over the telephone.130 
Any limitation of movement or other form of restraint placed on defendant during 
interrogation.  Courts have placed different weight on whether a prisoner was 
physically restrained.131  J.D. was not handcuffed, though the meeting did occur in a 
room separate from the general population.  Since there was a conference call, it may 
be presumed that the door was closed.  The trial court found that J.D. could not 
physically disengage herself completely from the conversation.132  
Length and mood of the interrogation.  The interrogation lasted forty minutes.  It 
is difficult to ascertain the mood from the court’s transcript excerpts.  The majority 
concluded that there was no evidence to indicate that J.D. was unable to terminate 
the telephone conversation.133  But the conversation began and ended with Kuretich 
speaking with the probation officer.  This could indicate that one or both of them 
controlled the length of the call.134  According to the dissent, “The trial court found 
that J.D. did not have control over the telephone and could not hang up at any time to 
end the interrogation.”135   
Whether directions were given to defendant during interrogation.  From the 
excerpts in the opinion, no explicit directions appear to have been provided. 
Presence of parents or whether parents had knowledge of the interrogation.  No 
parent was present, but J.D.’s mother knew of the interrogation.  Kuretich testified 
that the mother did not object to the telephone interrogation.136  Although Kuretich 
provided Miranda warnings to the mother, he did not give the warnings to J.D.137  
Had the court held that the interrogation was indeed custodial, the presence of a 
                                                                
129See id. at 769. 
130See Transcript, supra note 110, at 6. 
131Compare United States v. Conley, 779 F.2d 970, 973-74 (4th Cir. 1985) (finding no 
custody when prisoner wore handcuffs and full restraints because inmates were commonly 
transported in that manner) with North Dakota v. Conley, 574 N.W.2d 569, 572 (N.D. 1998) 
(finding custody when prisoner wore handcuffs during interview per prison policy) and 
Chamberlain, 163 F.3d at 504 (finding custody when door was closed but unlocked and 
prisoner was not restrained during interview). 
132See Transcript, supra note 110, at 6. 
133See J.D., 989 P.2d at 772. 
134See id. at 776. 
135Id. (Martinez, J., dissenting). 
136See id. at 771.  
137The court stated that Kuretich gave J.D.’s mother a written Miranda warning.  See id.  
However, the prosecutor informed the author that Kuretich provided a Miranda warning over 
the telephone.  Schulte interview, supra note 38. Since the court held that there was no 
custodial interrogation, the Miranda warning to the mother was not required.  The facts 
surrounding the telephone call to the mother were not litigated.  Still, it should be noted that in 
its discussion of the totality of the circumstances, the court mentioned the reading of the 
Miranda warning to the mother.  See J.D., 989 P.2d at 771. 
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parent would have been statutorily required and J.D.’s statements would have been 
inadmissible even if J.D. had been given Miranda warnings.138  
It can be questionable whether the parent understands the legal ramifications of 
the warnings, and it is also possible that the parent or guardian is not necessarily 
acting in the best interest of the child.139  For example, J.D. was a runaway and had a 
troubled relationship with her mother; this is exactly the type of situation in which 
adverse interests might be involved.140  Given these facts, it is questionable whether 
J.D.’s mother could make a decision about the interrogation that fully considered 
J.D.’s best interest. 
Nevertheless, the presence of a parent or custodian can help monitor and limit the 
police’s use of coercive techniques.  J.D. was separated from her family and legal 
counsel; surely she was susceptible to psychological manipulation and subtle 
coercion by the government officers.  Four-on-one bargaining is difficult for anyone; 
against a juvenile facing additional prison time, it is almost certainly coercive.  In 
Miranda, the Court’s prescribed procedural safeguards were directly intended to 
protect against psychological and not just physical coercion.141 
The preceding discussion of the fourteen factors is not meant to be definitive; 
rather, it is intended to show that reasonable minds can, and do, differ over 
interpretations of fact-specific totality-of-the-circumstances analyses.  In J.D., a 
majority of the Supreme Court of Colorado applied the same law as the dissent and 
the trial court, but reached a completely different result.142  Courts frequently use a 
totality-of-the-circumstances analysis to deal with a wide range of legal issues.  The 
weakness of the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis for determining the custody of 
prisoners is that different judges and courts often interpret the same or similar facts 
                                                                
138See 6 COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-511(1) (1999), discussed supra note 26 and 
accompanying text. 
139See Trey Meyer, Comment, Testing the Validity of Confessions and Waivers of the Self-
Incrimination Privilege in the Juvenile Courts, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 1035, 1064 (1999) (noting 
possibility that meaningful consultation with an interested adult may not occur 
notwithstanding presence of parent, guardian, or attorney); Evan Osnos & Julie Deardorff, 
Ten-Year-Old’s Slaying ‘Confession’ Barred, CHI. TRIB., July 20, 1999, at 1 (quoting Stephen 
Ceci, Professor of Developmental Psychology at Cornell University, stating that a parent alone 
is not the best person to be present during a police interview, rather it should be someone who 
is knowledgeable about the law). 
140The prosecutor informed the author that J.D. had a prior conviction for the theft of her 
mother’s car.  Also, J.D. was possibly in the custody of the Department of Social Services at 
the time of the interrogation.  Schulte interview, supra note 38.  
141The Court stated in Miranda: 
Again we stress that the modern practice of in-custody interrogation is psychologically 
rather than physically oriented.  As we have stated before … this Court has recognized 
that coercion can be mental as well as physical, and that the blood of the accused is 
not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition.  Interrogation still takes place 
in privacy.  
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448. 
142See J.D., 989 P.2d at 777 (Martinez, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (“While the 
majority ‘does not question the trial court’s decision to apply the totality of the circumstances 
standard’ or its ‘factual findings, none of which are in material dispute,’ they nonetheless 
apply the same standard to those findings and reach a different conclusion.”).  
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and circumstances differently.143  In expanding the analysis to include fourteen 
factors, the court in J.D. made the custodial interrogation question more 
indeterminate.  
Since coercion can easily occur off the record or through subtle psychological 
methods, a fact-based totality-of-the-circumstances analysis is not appropriate.  In 
Miranda, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that the secrecy of interrogations keeps a 
court from knowing actually what occurs in the interrogation rooms.144  In Perkins, 
the case involving questioning by an undercover agent in prison, the U.S. Supreme 
Court provided insight into the extent of Miranda protections in the prison setting.145  
This insight is helpful to understand why J.D. was decided erroneously.  The Court 
made several statements about facts that were lacking in the situation in Perkins that 
might otherwise have rendered the prison interrogation custodial.  The Court’s 
concern in Miranda, reiterated in Perkins, was that a police-dominated atmosphere 
would generate “inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the 
individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise 
do so freely.”146  
Several facts indicate that the coercion absent in Perkins was present in J.D.  
Once J.D. was in the small room with two officers and connected by speakerphone to 
two detectives, and the questioning focused on her, the atmosphere was police-
dominated.  
In Perkins, the Court stated, “It is the premise of Miranda that the danger of 
coercion results from the interaction of custody and official interrogation.”147  The 
Court’s use of the word “official” should not be seen as inadvertent.  Rather, it 
should be interpreted as an attempt to distinguish interrogations conducted by an 
apparent friend (i.e. undercover agents) from interrogations conducted by officials 
acting under color of law (i.e. known officers).  While the defendant in Perkins 
believed he was speaking freely to a fellow prisoner about past exploits, J.D. knew 
she was speaking with four government officers about her alleged involvement in an 
armed robbery and that criminal charges might be brought against her.  In J.D., the 
officers were openly acting under color of law; thus the interrogation was official.    
In Perkins, the Court stated that there are potential pressures present in 
questioning by captors who appear to the suspect to control the suspect’s fate.148  
These pressures were absent in Perkins, but present in J.D. The defendant in Perkins 
                                                                
143See supra note 131. 
144See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448 (“Privacy results in secrecy and this in turn results in a 
gap in our knowledge as to what in fact goes on in the interrogation rooms.”).  
145See supra § II(B)(1) (discussing Perkins). 
146Perkins, 496 U.S. at 296 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467).  See also Miranda, 384 
U.S. at 445 (stating that Miranda warning was intended to preserve privilege against self-
incrimination during “incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated 
atmosphere”). 
147See Perkins, 496 U.S. at 297 (emphasis added). 
148See id. (“Questioning by captors, who appear to control the suspect’s fate, may create 
mutually reinforcing pressures that the Court has assumed will weaken the suspect’s will….”).  
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did not believe that the questioner had any control over his fate.149  In contrast, J.D. 
was well aware that Detective Kuretich could work with the prosecutor in 
determining charges, and thus could exercise official power over her and affect her 
future treatment.  Additionally, since J.D. was a prisoner, the juvenile detention 
officer was capable of exercising official power over her.150 
In J.D., the respective totality-of-the-circumstances analyses by the majority and 
dissent differed sharply.  Their differing applications of the law to the facts indicate 
the weakness of the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis.  Moreover, as the 
foregoing discussion of the facts in J.D. shows, the totality-of-the-circumstances 
analysis should have resulted in a finding of custody for Miranda purposes.  The 
majority’s contrary finding is problematic.  A bright-line rule that juvenile prisoners 
are in custody for Miranda purposes would solve this problem.  
ii.  Failure of Statutory Safeguards 
The J.D. majority’s narrow interpretation of the meaning of custody defeated the 
purpose of the Colorado statute and precluded its protections.  Since the court held 
that there was no custodial interrogation, the statute did not apply.  Drawing on the 
policy behind the statute, the court could have chosen to apply a broader 
interpretation of custody for juveniles.  Such an interpretation would not have 
overruled Denison (the Colorado precedent for J.D.) because Denison involved an 
adult. 
The record indicates that Detective Kuretich provided Miranda warnings to 
J.D.’s mother, yet he never mentioned those same warnings to J.D.  The fact that 
Kuretich believed there was any reason at all to provide the warnings to the mother 
before questioning J.D. indicates that he had some sense that Miranda concerns 
might be implicated, if not required.  His omission of the Miranda warnings to J.D. 
points out the shortcoming of the statute when custodial interrogation is interpreted 
narrowly.  If the court had concluded that there was a custodial interrogation, then 
the mother (or another guardian or custodian) should have been present and the 
Miranda warnings should have been given.  Instead, under the court’s narrow 
interpretation of custody, Kuretich was able to omit the Miranda warnings.  Absent 
exigent circumstances, the time and effort required to provide Miranda warnings are 
minimal.151  Kuretich could have easily prefaced the questioning with the Miranda 
warnings.  
                                                                
149Id. at 297-98 (“When the suspect has no reason to think that the listeners have official 
power over him, it should not be assumed that his words are motivated by the reaction he 
expects from his listeners. … [Perkins] viewed the cellmate-agent as an equal and showed no 
hint of being intimidated by the atmosphere of the jail.”).  
150
“[O]ne of the people having control over her behavior within that facility was 
[Detention Officer] June Foster.”  Transcript, supra note 110, at 6. Accord Perkins, 496 U.S. 
at 303 (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that the state is in a unique position to exploit a 
prisoner’s vulnerability because the state has virtually complete control over the prisoner’s 
environment). 
151In a law review note, a student has stated:  “The privilege against self-incrimination is 
so vital to the individual, and the ease in reciting these rights so simple, that there is no reason 
for failing to give Miranda warnings to a juvenile custodial interrogee.”  Jaisle, supra note 95, 
at 288. 
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3.  Uncertainty in the Courts  
The totality-of-the-circumstances analysis is too uncertain when Miranda’s 
protections are involved.152  A rule of per se custody for juvenile prisoners subject to 
certain exceptions would provide government officers, courts, and individuals with 
the clear guidelines and protections intended by the Court in Miranda.  The prison 
setting is surely receptive to police coercion, yet the application of the additional-
restraint factors tends to result in a decision that the prisoner was not in custody for 
Miranda purposes.153  While confessions and bargaining are an important part of law 
enforcement, the playing field should be fair.154 
The goal of the U.S. Supreme Court in Miranda was to avoid fact-based 
voluntariness inquiries and rely on a per se rule that errs on the side of protection 
rather than coercion.155  The lower courts, however, have not applied Miranda 
accordingly.156 Not only have the courts analyzed custodial interrogations under the 
more exacting additional-restraint factors, but they have reached different results on 
similar facts.157  
                                                                
152See Cadmus, 614 F. Supp. at 372 (stating that Cervantes standard is elusive). 
153See Morales, 834 F.2d at 39 (Oakes, J., concurring) (“[C]ourts applying these factors 
invariably conclude that the challenged interrogations are noncustodial, suggesting that the 
factors may merely disguise a denial of prisoners’ Fifth Amendment rights.”).  See also 
Cadmus, 614 F. Supp. at 372 (finding prison setting to be inherently coercive). 
154The U.S. Supreme Court has stated:  
[A]dmissibility of a confession turns as much on whether the techniques for extracting 
the statements, as applied to this suspect, are compatible with a system that presumes 
innocence and assures that a conviction will not be secured by inquisitorial means as 
on whether the defendant's will was in fact overborne. 
Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 116 (1985).  
155The U.S. Supreme Court has stated recently:  
In Miranda, the Court noted that reliance on the traditional totality-of-the-
circumstances test raised a risk of overlooking an involuntary custodial confession, a 
risk that the Court found unacceptably great….  The Court therefore concluded that 
something more than the totality test was necessary. 
Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2335 (2000). 
156See Cadmus, 614 F. Supp. at 372 (“Application of the principles enunciated in 
Cervantes… would reintroduce, in the prison setting, the case-by-case analysis of 
coerciveness that Miranda was intended to avoid.”).  As Professor Magid has noted: 
Thus far, the additional-restraint test has been used to find that many inmates are not 
in custody at the moment they are questioned in prison and can be questioned with no 
warnings at all.  The test would be better used to find that… once approached, an 
inmate very likely returns to a custodial state and is entitled to be warned or otherwise 
protected before any questioning. 
Magid, supra note 55, at 951. 
157Compare Chamberlain, 163 F.3d at 504 (finding custody when prisoner was questioned 
in prison office but was not handcuffed) with Conley, 779 F.2d at 973-74 (finding no custody 
when prisoner in handcuffs and full restraints was questioned in conference area awaiting 
medical treatment) and Cervantes, 589 F.2d at 426-27 (finding no custody when prisoner was 
escorted to six-by-four-foot jail library and questioned by two officers about stabbing incident 
and suspicious substance found in matchbox).  See also supra note 85. 
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The additional-restraint factors place too high of a burden on the defendant to 
satisfy the custody prong of the custodial interrogation analysis.  The difficulty of 
demonstrating custody under the additional-restraint factors allows unwarned 
questioning to occur unless the officers overtly overreach.  The unlikelihood that a 
court will find custody under the additional-restraint factors could encourage officers 
to question prisoners cleverly and to avoid providing Miranda warnings.  
In Miranda, the Court stated a bright-line rule, one that provides a clear standard 
for individuals, law enforcement officers, and the courts.  In Mathis, the Court 
extended the bright-line rule to prison interrogations.  In Dickerson, the Court 
reaffirmed its commitment to Miranda’s bright-line rule.  The subjective uncertainty 
that the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis and the additional-restraint factors will 
provide adequate protection to juveniles, demands a bright-line rule.158 
Some courts have stated a concern that a rule of per se custody would provide 
more protection to prisoners than free individuals.  Under the application of the 
additional-restraint factors, prisoners receive substantially less protection than free 
individuals.  The only reason J.D. was not legally entitled to receive Miranda 
warnings was because of her incarceration; such a tortured result is unnecessary. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Courts should construe the meaning of custody for juvenile prisoners broadly. 
Juvenile prisoners should receive Miranda warnings prior to interrogation by a state 
official unless the situation involves exigent circumstances.  
                                                                
158As one court stated:  
A rule requiring that Miranda warnings be administered any time an individual in 
custody is questioned about criminal activity … protects both law enforcement 
objectives and the Fifth Amendment, and will avoid problems, not cause more 
confusion.  Neither the police nor the courts will have to speculate as to whether or 
when Miranda warnings must be given to a person in custody. 
Holt, 725 N.E.2d at 1159-60. 
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